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Abstract 
The paper analyzes the incidence, the severity and the determinants of household poverty in 
Ukraine during transition using two comparable surveys from 1996 and 2004. We measure 
poverty  using  income  and  consumption  and  contrast  the  effects  of  various  poverty  lines. 
Poverty  in  both  periods  follows  some  of  the  determinants  commonly  identified  in  the 
literature, including greater poverty among households with children and with less education. 
We  also  identify  specific  features  of  poverty  in  transition,  including  the  relatively  low 
importance  of  unemployment  and  the  existence  of  poverty  even  among  households  with 




The  paper  analyzes  household  poverty  in  a  transition  economy  in  times  of  economic 
restructuring,  structural  adjustment  and  subsequent  growth.  In  particular,  we  study  the 
incidence, severity and determinants of household poverty over time using multiple measures 
of  household  welfare.  Our  analysis  examines  two  comparable  household  surveys  from 
Ukraine from 1996 and 2004, which represent years of extreme economic depression and of 
sustainable recovery, respectively. Our paper hence offers insights into how and how much 
the long-term transition process affects household welfare. The ‘how’ concerns the roles of 
household composition (including age and gender), human capital, ethnicity, assets, location 
and transition-specific labor market issues like wage arrears. We pay particular attention to 
adjustments of the labor market which is a key mechanism by which households experience 
macroeconomic  and  firm-level  restructurings.  The  ‘how  much’  is  addressed  by  studying 
household  consumption  and  household  income,  analyzing  various  poverty  lines  and 
emphasizing the role of inequality. 
The  focus  on  Ukraine  is  not  by  accident.  First,  the  country  is  particularly  well  suited  to 
address the questions on the long-term changes in poverty induced by the transition process 
characterized by large initial shock and following recovery.  Indeed, the magnitude of the 
restructuring was enormous, with real GDP declining by more than 60% in the 1990s, and the 
recovery  of  the  2000s  was  impressive.  Second,  Ukraine  is  characterized  by  considerable 
regional diversity and the well-known divide along the ethnic and linguistic lines that became 
particularly pronounced since the 2004 Orange revolution. Finally, Ukraine is also the only Determinants of Poverty during Transition  3 
(apart from the Russian Federation) country in the CIS which has an established household 
panel dataset. 
We find a substantial level of extreme poverty in Ukraine in the middle of the recession, 
which halved after four years of robust economic growth. However, absolute poverty declined 
less or even increased slightly, depending on the measure used, while inequality improved 
only when measured by income. These measurement issues are highly relevant in the context 
of transition and may have led previous studies to underestimate the extent of poverty in 
Ukraine. We also find that the determinants of poverty in Ukraine are largely in line with the 
poverty literature, including greater poverty among households with children and with less 
education.  In  addition,  we  identify  some  specific  features  of  household  poverty  that  are 
mostly  associated  with  the  transition  process  such  as  the  relatively  low  importance  of 
unemployment  and  the  existence  of  poverty  even  among  households  with  employment, 
especially during the time of economic collapse. We also document substantial changes in the 
determinants of poverty over time, which can be explained by the emergence of competitive 
labor markets as one aspect of the processes of transition and restructuring. 
The  long-term  nature  of  our  study  and  the  identification  of  key  transmission  channels  of 
transition-related labor market effects on poverty at the household level are unique features of 
the paper and hence represent its key contributions to the literature. Further strengths of the 
paper  include  its  consistent  use  of  multiple  measures  of  household  poverty,  of  multiple 
estimation  techniques  in  its  poverty  analysis  and  of  multiple  poverty  lines  for  reasons  of 
robustness  and  comparability  with  alternative  studies.  We  also  address  explicitly 
distributional  consequences  of  transition  across  the  income  distribution  and  across 
geographical  dimensions  and  we  investigate  the  potential  role  of  ethnic  discrimination. 
Finally, no single study has previously addressed the questions of transition and structural 
change on poverty using Ukrainian data. We believe that our paper is hence of interest to 
readers of the transition literature in particular but also of the literature on household welfare 
under uncertainty in general. 
We would like to clarify what our paper does not aim to achieve. We do not conduct panel 
data analysis due to data limitations, thus preventing a sound analysis of poverty dynamics. 
Furthermore, we do not assess the effects of social policies on household welfare, which is 
why we have also limited the discussion of the policy implications of our findings. We hope 
to turn to these points in our later work, using newly collected data. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section reviews the empirical literature on 
poverty in transition countries. Section 3 presents the conceptual framework. Sections 4 and 5 Determinants of Poverty during Transition  4 
introduce the data and the methods respectively. Section 6 discusses the summary statistics 
and regression results while section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Transition and household welfare: literature review 
Macroeconomic  and  firm-level  structural  changes  that  accompanied  the  transition  from  a 
planned to a market economy in Central and Eastern Europe resulted in a dramatic decline in 
economic  activity,  rivaling  that  of  the  Great  Depression  in  the  1930s.  From  the  start  of 
transition in 1989 until the resumption of economic growth, these countries lost from between 
one fifth to more than two-thirds of their pre-transition level of GDP (EBRD 2000). The 
magnitude and length of the recession differed a great deal across countries depending on 
their  initial  conditions  as  well  as  the  nature,  sequencing  and  speed  of  the  political  and 
economic reforms implemented. Two common patterns emerged in the region. One pattern 
occurred in Central Europe with modest declines and quick recoveries. The other pattern was 
characteristic of the CIS countries with much deeper and longer declines, turning into robust 
economic  growth  only  by  the  end  of  the  1990s  (World  Bank  2002).  Despite  certain 
differences across the countries, the dramatic fall of output in the 1990s is regarded as the 
main defining feature – and also the major surprise – of the transformation process in the 
entire region at the macroeconomic level (Gomulka 1998). 
The transition process could not pass without far-reaching consequences for the standard of 
living  of  individuals  and  households  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe.  The  main  channels 
propagating the changes induced by the economic transition were adjustments of the labor 
market, changes in social spending and transfers by the governments, and the loss of financial 
savings wiped out by hyperinflation in the early years of the transition. 
The labor market had to accommodate the fall in the demand for labor, which was not only 
the result of the output collapse during the transition but also a consequence of inefficient use 
of labor resources during the central planning period (Adam 1982). The reaction of the labor 
market to declining demand was via falling employment rates, raising unemployment and 
decreasing  real  wages.  Moreover,  the  labor  market  adjustment  included  sectoral  and 
occupational reallocation of labor as well as large shifts in relative pay (Jackman 1998). The 
latter was driven by a move from compressed wage differentials, that were imposed by the 
central planner and barely took into account workers’ productivity, to a more market-based 
wage setting mechanism. Determinants of Poverty during Transition  5 
As  in  the  case  of  output  dynamics,  the  adjustment  of  the  labor  markets  in  the  transition 
countries  followed  rather  different  paths  (Svejnar  1999).  Central  European  countries 
experienced falling employment rates and growing unemployment, accompanied by a modest 
decline  in  real  wages.  The  former  Soviet  Union  instead  saw  collapsing  real  wages  with 
relatively  limited  rises  in  unemployment  and  falls  in  employment  at  least  conditional  on 
output losses (Boeri and Terrell 2002). In addition, non-standard mechanisms of labor market 
adjustment became widespread in the region, especially during the phase of economic decline. 
These included wage arrears, forced leaves, reduction in hours of work and in-kind payments 
(Lehmann,  Wadsworth  and  Acquisti  1999;  Earle  and  Sabirianova  2002;  Haltiwanger, 
Lehmann and Terrell 2003).
1 With the resumption of economic growth, the incidence of these 
non-standard mechanisms was reduced considerably (Klugman and Kolev 2001; Gerry, Kim 
and Li 2004; Boyarchuk, Maliar and Maliar 2005). 
A change in the wage-setting mechanism became another important element of the transition 
process with potentially strong effects for household well-being. Rather than being fixed by 
the state as in the Soviet period, wages started to reflect individual productivity and effort 
with gradually increasing returns to human capital (Gorodnichenko and Sabirianova Peter 
2005; Munich, Svejnar and Terrell 2005). This resulted in a raising inequality of the wage 
distribution, driving the rise in income inequality (Keane and Prasad 2002). Additional factor 
increasing  income  inequality  was  the  development  of  the  private  sector,  including  the 
privatization of formerly state-owned enterprises, though the evidence concerning the role of 
this  channel  in  different  countries  is  somewhat  mixed  (Commander,  Tolstopiatenko  and 
Yemtsov 1999; Milanovic 1999; Birdsall and Nellis 2003). 
The  reduction  in  welfare  benefits  and  transfers  caused  by  shrinking  fiscal  revenues  also 
affected  household  welfare  (Barbone  and  Polackova  1996;  Klugman  and  Kolev  2001). 
However, the transition countries experienced considerable heterogeneity with respect to the 
dynamics and effects of social spending. For example, Garner and Terrell (1998) argue that 
the social safety nets in Central Europe confined inequality that would have resulted from the 
introduction of market forces while according to Commander, Tolstopiatenko and Yemtsov 
(1999) the Russian social safety net rather contributed to higher income inequality. Evidence 
suggests that compared with the states of the former USSR, the countries of Central Europe 
better managed to contain the drop in transfers, presumably due to better tax collection but 
also because of better economic and political contestability established from the start of the 
transition process. 
                                                 
1 Boeri and Terrell (2002) provide evidence that the differences in labor market adjustment are related to the 
different levels of expenditure and structures of non-employment benefit between these two regions. Determinants of Poverty during Transition  6 
The transition process suddenly brought many households in Central and Eastern Europe to 
the edge of physical survival. Poverty, as conventionally defined to indicate the lack of a 
minimum standard of material well-being, hence became one of the most important problems 
facing the region.
2 At the height of the macroeconomic crisis poverty rates in some countries 
approached 50% (World Bank 2000a; 2005).
3 As economic growth resumed throughout the 
region at the end of the 1990s, poverty rates declined substantially (World Bank 2005). The 
remainder  of  this  section  summarizes  the  empirical  research  of  the  determinants  of  the 
poverty in the region. 
Existing  research  has  firmly  established  several  common  correlates  or  determinants  of 
poverty in the transition countries. For example, it is typically found that the incidence of 
poverty is larger among large households, single parent households as well as households 
with a higher than average number of dependants in relation to income earners (Milanovic 
1996; Lokshin and Popkin 1999). These are also common patterns observed in developing 
countries.  Interestingly  and  in  contrast  to  the  stylized  facts  of  poverty  in  many  low-  and 
middle-income countries, there has been little evidence of higher poverty risk for the elderly 
in the region (Milanovic 1996; Klugman, Micklewright and Redmond 2002). Many other 
factors, which usually determine poverty in less developed countries, do not show a consistent 
pattern either across transition countries or over time. For example, some evidence suggests 
that families with low educated heads or main income providers were more likely to fall into 
poverty in the Central European countries. The same relationship in the CIS was found to be 
very weak in the second half of the 1990s (World Bank 2000a) but strengthening in the 2000s 
(World  Bank  2005).  Unemployment  is  another  case  in  point.  Compared  with  the  Central 
European  region,  this  factor  seems  to  have  been  relatively  less  pronounced  in  the  CIS 
countries in the 1990s, but appears to have grown since 2000 (World Bank 2000a; 2005). 
Note, however, that most such evidence comes from a simplified approach using $1 or $2 
international poverty lines to construct poverty profiles and relative risk ratios as in World 
Bank (2000a; 2005), which ignores a number of important methodological issues such as 
equivalence scales. Gustafsson and Nivorozhkina (2004) provide a more rigorous evidence on 
the evolution of poverty and its determinants over the course of transition. However, they 
focus on one city only. Overall, the existing knowledge on the determinants of poverty during 
transition remains scarce, especially in the CIS countries.  
                                                 
2  Hereafter  our  view  of  poverty  emphasizes  the  material  aspect  of  well-being,  as  much  of  the  economics 
literature  does.  However,  there  are  other  dimensions  of  deprivation  such  as  poor  health,  lack  of  access  to 
education,  limited  access  to  basic  infrastructure  as  well  as  psychological  dimensions  (powerlessness, 
voicelessness, dependency, shame, humiliation, etc). 
3 Poverty was not unknown in the region during the communist rule, but its scope was limited. According to 
World Bank estimates, only 2% of people were poor before the start of the transition (World Bank 2000a). Determinants of Poverty during Transition  7 
Our study aims to fill this gap for Ukraine. Ukraine was experiencing economic decline for 10 
consecutive years between 1990 and 1999 with its real GDP falling by over 60% (Table 1). 
The rebound since 2000 has been remarkable, but the real GDP in 2004 represented only 
about 58% of its 1989 value. The decline of real wages followed a similar pattern. Until 1999 
real wages dropped to less then half of their 1989 value and experienced a vigorous recovery, 
almost reaching the 1989 values by 2004. Interestingly, the employment ratio was much less 
variable, falling from 77.2% in 1996 to 67.0% in 2004. Unemployment only rose to almost 
12% in 1999, dropping to 8.6% in 2004.  
Previous evidence on poverty in Ukraine largely comes from two studies by the World Bank 
(1996; 2005). These use different survey instruments and are therefore not quite comparable. 
The first of the mentioned studies provides a static picture based on 1995 data while the latter 
covers the period from 1999 to 2003 but is not very informative about the developments in the 
1990s, the period of the most intense transition. 
 
3. Conceptual approach 
3.1. Measures of welfare 
Most poverty studies focus on income or consumption expenditures measures of the material 
aspect of individual and household welfare. There is considerable ambiguity as to which of 
these indicators is a better measure of welfare. The use of income may be advocated on the 
grounds  that  it  better  proxies  for  living  standards,  which  are  generally  hard  to  quantify 
(Atkinson 1991). Another argument in favor of income is the idea that the welfare indicator 
should measure the opportunities for consumption open to a family rather than consumption 
per se (Atkinson 1991; Ravallion 1992). However, the income indicator of welfare suffers 
from  a  number  of  flaws.  First,  when  measured  over  short  periods,  it  may  considerably 
understate or overstate the standard of living due to significant variations in income over time 
(for example, due to the seasonality of earnings). Second, income measures are expected to 
underestimate the true welfare because people tend to underreport income or have difficulties 
in  quantifying  their  earnings  if  those  stem  from  self-employment  and  capital  income 
(Atkinson, Rainwater and Smeedin 1995). Consumption is often considered to be a better 
indicator of the general welfare (as households smooth their consumption over time) and to 
contain smaller measurement error compared with income. 
The relative merits of one measure versus the other depend to a large extent on the economic 
and institutional environment of the country under study. In particular, income measures are Determinants of Poverty during Transition  8 
considered to be quite problematic in less developed countries where much of the population 
are involved in non-market activities and where income is subject to considerable seasonal 
variability with much income deriving from agriculture. In many empirical applications, the 
measure  of  choice  in  developed  countries  is  income  while  in  developing  countries  it  is 
consumption (Ravallion 1992). 
Given the transition nature of Ukraine and the fact that we analyze and compare two years 
which are very distinct in terms of the market institutions of the country, it is impossible to 
identify a preferred measure a priori. While acknowledging their weaknesses and strengths, 
we  thus  employ  both  measures  –  income  and  consumption  –  in  order  to  draw  a  more 
comprehensive picture of household poverty. There exist several reasons to expect differences 
between both welfare measures in a transition context: First, households make intensive use 
of  home  production  in  many  transition  countries.  Second,  there  might  be  a  bias  from 
underreporting  income  from  the  shadow  economy.  Third,  the  non-monetary  exchange  of 
commodities and barter became widespread, especially at the early stage of transition. Fourth, 
consumption smoothing and insurance mechanisms separate actual income from consumption 
flows, with the degree to which households are actually able to smooth their consumption or 
separate their consumption from their income streams likely to change over the transition 
process. 
 
3.2. The estimation framework 
The analysis of poverty is mostly based on multivariate regression methods that attempt to 
identify the determinants of poverty at the household level, using reduced form models of 
various  structural  relationships  that  affect  poverty  (Glewwe  1991).  One  approaches  is  to 
estimate a „welfare function” of a continuous measure of household welfare, such as income 
or  consumption  expenditures.  Alternatively,  „poverty  functions”  link  household-related 
variables to a household-specific poverty indicator, defined on the basis of a „poverty line” 
(Appleton 2002). The latter is a predetermined standard of well-being below which a person 
or a household is classified as poor (Ravallion 1992).
4 Regardless of the definition of the 
poverty  line,  most  commonly  used  dependent  variables  in  poverty  functions  are  binary 
indicators of poverty status or measures of the poverty gap. 
Both approaches have some merits. One the one hand, the welfare functions are advocated on 
the grounds that they utilize full information on the distribution of income or consumption 
                                                 
4 These may be absolute, relative or subjective. Determinants of Poverty during Transition  9 
while the poverty functions waste a significant fraction of it, if not collapsing the welfare 
measure  into  just  two  values  (Ravallion  1992;  Grootaert  1997).  However,  the  level 
regressions  have  long  been  criticized  for  imposing  constant  parameters  over  the  entire 
distribution  thus  assuming  that  the  effect  of  household  composition,  education,  and  other 
variables  is  the  same  for  poor  and  non-poor  households.
5  Another  pitfall  of  the  level 
regressions is that they do not pay explicit attention to the poor and give excessive weight to 
outliers (Baulch and Masset 2003). Given the complementary insights from both models we 
use and compare both approaches. To overcome some of the limitations of these estimation 
strategies  and  to  gain  further  insights  into  how  the  determinants  of  household  well-being 
change across the entire welfare distribution, we also estimate welfare quantile regressions. 
 
3.3. Explanatory variables in a transition context 
The  right-hand-side  of  the  household  welfare  regression  equation  typically  comprises 
household composition variables, measures of physical assets and human capital, transition 
specific labor market shocks, and geographic controls. The age-specific and-gender-specific 
household  composition  might  play  a  decisive  role  especially  in  a  transition  context  with 
continuous  changes  of  the  role  of  the  state  and  an  ongoing  development  towards  market 
adjustment mechanisms. The household composition affects the distribution and importance 
of different incomes sources: labor market earnings, state benefits to families or pensioners, 
stipends to students. The role of the age composition of the household (also indicating the 
status in the household life cycle) has a special meaning in a transition context: different age 
groups are associated with different levels of the household’s Soviet experience, which might 
be disadvantageous under the rules of a market economy. However, the effect of elderly on 
household well-being is not clear ex ante: although potentially disadvantaged due to Soviet 
training and experience, pensioners might be better off after the substantial increases in the 
pension level over the last years. For example, the share of pensions (and stipends) in total 
household resources has increased from 18 to 22% between 2003 and 2004 while the share of 
labor remunerations remained stable at 45% (State Statistics Committee of Ukraine 2007). It 
is furthermore important to focus on gender differences and vulnerable groups like female 
households, especially in an intertemporal comparative analysis, since the transition process 
in Ukraine was generally associated with changing and increasing gender wage gaps (e.g., 
                                                 
5 Appleton (2002) for instance suggests several arguments why returns to assets may be different among the poor 
and non-poor. Determinants of Poverty during Transition  10 
Brainerd 2000), as well as shrinking child care facilities and increasing child care costs like in 
Russia (Lokshin 2004). 
The role of ethnicity has become an important field of research in countries of the former 
Soviet Union in general and for Ukraine specifically (Constant, Kahanec and Zimmermann 
2006). Expert interviews in Ukraine led us to hypothesize that the country does not suffer 
from ethnically based discrimination. To investigate the issue in more detail, we take a closer 
look  at  welfare  differences  between  Ukrainian-speaking  and  non-Ukrainian-speaking 
households. 
The physical and human capital variables will be included in the analysis on the premise that 
poverty on the individual or household level is linked to the absence of assets, low returns to 
these assets and the volatility of these returns (World Bank 2000b). For example, the level of 
education of a household might well affect the ability of a household to access and process 
relevant  information  to  cope  with  economically  difficult  situations  or  to  improve  one’s 
situation on the labor market. The command over a productive asset, as another example, 
might improve the welfare of the household by making it more autarkic if it enables self-
employment activity. On the other hand and as a consequence of a shock, households may 
lose assets or deliberately deplete them to smooth their consumption which might translate 
into long-term negative effects on household welfare. 
We are also interested in understanding the transmission channels and the effects of macro-
level  changes  through  the  labor  market  on  household  welfare.  We  thus  introduce  several 
measures to capture the household’s status regarding its labor market participation as well as 
its exposure to negative labor market shocks. We intend to shed light on the black box of how 
the  following  labor  market  shocks  impact  on  household  welfare:  wage  arrears,  in-kind 
payments, forced leave and unemployment.  
Three  issues  are  of  special  importance  when  analyzing  the  effect  of  these  shocks  on 
household welfare: First, there is a shift over the transition process regarding the  general 
incidence of shocks and the degree to which the likelihood of experiencing a shock can be 
linked to worker and/or job-specific characteristics. We hypothesize that the propensity to be 
affected by a labor market shock was generally high and rather randomly distributed. In other 
words, shocks were not primarily linked to the individual characteristics of workers but rather 
with an industry sector or enterprise.
6 In the late transition the frequency and incidence of 
                                                 
6 For example, Lehmann and Wadsworth (2007) show for Russia that the distribution of (contractual) wages of 
the  workers  experiencing  arrears  is  very  close  to  the  distribution  of  wages  in  the  population,  suggesting 
„randomness” of the arrears from an individual perspective. Determinants of Poverty during Transition  11 
shocks became smaller and – along with developing labor market institutions – much more 
selective and related to worker specific characteristics, like education.  
Second,  the  immediate  loss  of  income  differs  across  shocks.  Forced  unpaid  leaves  and 
unemployment represent the two most extreme forms of income loss. The former shock might 
be attenuated by  some  fringe benefits, which are  associated with formal employment but 
independent of actual hours worked. The latter loss may be reduced through unemployment 
benefits, although unemployment benefits were rare and the level of the benefits was very low 
at the beginning of transition. The implications of wage arrears and in-kind payments for 
household welfare are likely to be less severe, as only a fraction of the wage is not being paid 
(in time). 
Third, behavioral consequences at the household level may differ across the types of shock, 
since different shocks might be associated with different expectations regarding future income 
streams.  A  household  facing  wage  arrears  may  expect  the  employer  to  pay  back  the 
outstanding  wage.  Wage  arrears,  in-kind  payments  or  forced  leave  are  all  connected  to 
persons under contract. These employees may expect higher future income streams – at least 
in terms of fringe benefits – than unemployed persons. 
The above mentioned shocks influence the „freely disposable” time of the household: While 
wage arrears and in-kind payments are more likely to be associated with ordinary working 
hours, unemployment and forced leave provide time for complementary coping strategies. 
Those strategies may partly compensate for the consumption and/or income gap and affect the 
extent, to which income shocks are translated into consumption shocks. However, this last 
issue is beyond the scope of this paper and will be addressed in future research. 
Geographic controls contribute to the understanding of special risk exposure, for example of 
single  enterprise  towns.  They  thus  partly  proxy  for  industry  structure  which  was  highly 
„spatialized”  during  Soviet  times,  they  also  give  an  indication  for  the  regional  diffusion 
processes of shocks and growth between the centre and the periphery of the country. 
 
4. Data 
This  study  uses  data  from  two  household  surveys  collected  in  Ukraine  by  the  Kiev 
International  Institute  of  Sociology  (KIIS)  in  1996  (abbreviated  Ukraine-96)  and  2004 
(Ukrainian  Longitudinal  Monitoring  Survey,  abbreviated  ULMS)  (Lehmann  and  Terrell 
2006).  Ukraine-96  is  representative  of  all  households  in  Ukraine  while  ULMS  is 
representative  of  the  working  age  population  of  Ukraine.  Similar  sampling  strategies  and Determinants of Poverty during Transition  12 
substantial  similarities  of  the  survey  instruments  provide  an  excellent  opportunity  for  the 
intertemporal  comparison  of  household  welfare.  Both  surveys  define  a  household  as 
consisting of all those persons living together and sharing at least some common income and 
expenditures. The quality of the surveys is very high and comparable to that of the RLMS for 
Russia. We are not aware of higher quality households surveys spanning almost a decade in 
any other country of the former Soviet Union (apart from Russia). Key information on both 
surveys is provided in Table 2.  
Among the most important variables in our analysis are the two welfare measures household 
consumption and household income. To enable intertemporal comparisons it is important to 
choose  and  construct  these  variables  such  that  they  measure  and  capture  the  same 
information. The income variable represents the sum of all incomes received by all household 
members during the last 30 days. It comprises monetary income as well as income received in 
the form of goods and services (their monetary evaluation was given by the respondents). 
Among  the  main  income  sources  included  were  after-tax  incomes  from  individual  labor 
activities, incomes from the sale of home production, from capital investments, rental income 
from property, pension payments, unemployment and social benefits, alimony payments as 
well as help and gifts. To improve data quality on income, household income components 
from different income generating sources (e.g. wage income, benefits, pensions) from the 
household survey were cross-checked with the aggregated values from individual data. Since 
high-income households are likely to be underrepresented we refrained from deleting outliers 
from the sample
7. 
The consumption measure captures actual household consumption on around 60 food items 
(including  alcohol  and  eating  out),  expenditure  on  non-food  day-to-day  items  including 
tobacco (around 20 items), as well as payments for services, rent and utility in the last 30 
days.  Due  to  insufficient  information  we  refrained  from  evaluating  assets  or  including 
purchases  of  durable  goods.  After  correcting  for  outliers  and  missing  values  in  food 
consumption and expenditures, households’ food consumption is evaluated using actual unit 
prices paid by households or by median regional unit prices if the respective household was 
lacking expenditure information on that specific item. By looking at actual food consumption 
rather than food expenditures, our consumption measure reflects more comprehensively the 
actual  level  of  household  well-being.  However,  given  this  definition,  the  consumption 
measure also potentially reflects coping strategies (home grown and produced food) adopted 
by household.  
                                                 
7 Nevertheless, excluding all households with welfare levels above the ninety-ninth percentile does not alter the 
results of the regression analysis (results not shown); inequality measures, of course, are affected. Determinants of Poverty during Transition  13 
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics of both welfare measures and all variables used in this 
paper
8. To aid intertemporal comparisons, we express all monetary measures in July 2004 
Ukrainian hryvnias using monthly national CPI deflators. It should be mentioned that the 
officially published deflators are calculated from Ukrainian household budget surveys and 
may suffer from seasonal as well as regional biases, especially because they are collected 
under  the  premise  that  rural  households  exhibit  a  similar  consumption  behavior  to  urban 
households.
9  
Table  3  shows  a  considerable  difference  between  the  two  welfare  measures,  household 
income and consumption. This may be driven by the fact that of home produced food is 
incorporated  in  the  consumption  but  not  income  measure.  Nevertheless,  the  gap  between 
consumption  and  income  could  be  furthermore  interpreted  as  an  indicator  of  the  shadow 
economy (and non-reported income stemming from respective activities) or might be driven 
by saving and borrowing and emerging credit markets.
10 
Other  variables  in  our  household  welfare  model  include  household  composition 
characteristics, productive assets, transition specific shocks measured at the household level, 
and geographical controls. We control for household composition by including the size of the 
household (in logs) and shares of persons in different age groups in the household (share of 
children  younger than 15; of persons aged 15-25, persons aged 26-40 (omitted category); 
persons aged 41-pension age; and persons in pension age). We furthermore include a dummy 
variable identifying households consisting only of females. The variable ukrainian indicates 
that a household normally speaks Ukrainian.  
As proxies for human capital and productive assets of the household we use average years of 
schooling of all household members in the working age as well a variable indicating whether 
a household owned or used any land in the last 12 months (access) and a lagged variable 
indicating the possession of a car or truck in the previous year (carown). The former measure 
affects welfare primarily via the labor market while the latter variables indicate the capacity 
of  households  to  engage  in  coping  strategies  (Zimmerman  and  Carter  2003).  The  asset 
variables can also be interpreted as proxies for the cumulative wealth status of the household. 
The  labor  market  and  shock  related  information  enters  the  regression  equations  through 
several  dummy  variables,  indicating  whether  the  household  has  no  economically  active 
                                                 
8  In the regression equations, the natural log of the welfare measures are used instead. 
9  Official  publications  by  the  Ukrainian  State  Statistics  Committee  provide  limited  information  on  the 
methodology to construct the national CPI (Revenko 2006). 
10 Gorodnichenko and Sabirianova Peter (2007) use the discrepancy between income and consumption of public 
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members (inactive) and whether at least one person in the household experienced one of the 
following  transition  related  shocks  recently:  wage  arrears  (arrears),  in-kind  payments  of 
wages (inkind), forced leave (leave) and unemployment status (unemploy).
11 
The remaining variables in Table 3 and in our regression analysis are geographical controls. 
We  distinguish  between  rural  areas,  towns  with  population  up  to  one  hundred  thousand 
inhabitants and big cities as well as macro-regions (as conventionally defined by the KIIS). 
 
5. Methodology 
Our  empirical  strategy  to  assess  the  incidence  of  poverty  and  its  determinants  over  time 
involved the following steps and methods, which will be described and discussed in more 
detail below: (1) setting the poverty line, (2) analysis of determinants of welfare in a broad 
sense  (OLS  regressions)  and  (3)  an  analysis  of  poverty  in  a  more  narrow  sense  (probit 
regressions).  In  order  to  further  refine  the  analysis  we  (4)  investigate  differences  in  the 
determinants  across  the  welfare  distribution  (quantile  regressions)  and  (5)  test  for  ethnic 
discrimination (Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition). 
 
5.1 Setting the poverty line 
To identify poor households, we calculated household specific poverty lines according to the 
cost of basic needs method (see Kakwani (2003) for a review): (I) The extreme poverty line 
states  the  monetary  amount  needed  to  cover  the  cost  of  the  calorie  requirements  of  a 
household, given its age and gender specific composition and accounting for regional food 
price differences. By accounting for gender- and age-specific calorie needs, we address the 
differential  needs  of  different  household  members  (Deaton  1997;  Lanjouw,  Lanjouw, 
Milanovic and Paternostro 2004). (IIa) The absolute poverty line adds to the extreme poverty 
line a non-food allowance, which is set according to the share of non-food expenditures in 
total consumption expenditures of those households close to the extreme poverty line (21% in 
1996 and 34% in 2004). 
Both poverty lines were calculated for both years taking into account the respective food and 
overall consumption patterns and baskets in the relevant years. This is done as the transition 
process  can  be  expected  to  lead  to  changes  in  the  composition  of  monetary  household 
consumption  basket,  for  example  as  social  services  and  utilities  cease  to  be  subsidized 
                                                 
11 The variable leave denoted forced unpaid leave in 1996 and forced leave (both paid and unpaid) in 2004. Determinants of Poverty during Transition  15 
substantially. In fact, the share of the non-food allowance increases from 21% in 1996 to 34% 
in 2004. Table 4 provides examples of the poverty lines for two different household types. 
To better assess and compare the extent of poverty as it would have prevailed in 2004 had 
only prices changed compared to 1996 (and not the food consumption basket nor the non-food 
share), we furthermore calculated (IIb) an absolute poverty line deflating the extreme poverty 
line  from  1996  to  2004  values  using  the  national  CPI  and  adding  the  1996  non-food 
allowance.  
 
5.2 Household welfare model (OLS) 
We analyze the determinants of welfare ω of household i = 1…N in a multivariate framework 
using the following reduced-form linear model: 
  ωi   =  α + Li β + Ai γ + (transition shocks)i   + Vi δ + εi  (1) 
The  specification  contains  the  exogenous  welfare  determinants  describing  household 
characteristics Li, productive assets and human capital Ai, indicators for labor market shocks, 
(transition shocks)i, and geographic controls Vi. In equation (1) εi is an error term that is 
assumed to be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. 
 
5.3 Household poverty status (probit regression) 
Our second approach to assess the determinants of poverty is by estimating the households’ 
probability of being either income or consumption poor. We expect these poverty functions to 
yield similar results as the welfare functions. A household is considered to be poor (pi = 1) if 
its total consumption or income ωi are below the calculated absolute poverty line πi in the 
respective year. Otherwise it is considered non poor (pi = 0). The analysis is based on the 
assumption that the probability of being poor can be estimated with the probit model that 
contains the same determinants as in (1): 
  Prob (pi = 1) = F (Li β + Ai γ + (transition shocks)i   + Vi δ+ εi)  (2) 
 
5.4 Differences in determinants across the distribution (quantile regressions) 
The  impact  of  factors  on  household  welfare  may  vary  depending  on  the  location  of  the 
household in the overall distribution of welfare. To explore whether transition specific labor 
market shocks have a more detrimental impact on poorer households, we employ quantile 
regressions to estimate equation (1) for household consumption Ci,. Thus, to study how the 
distributional position of a household affects the interplay between explanatory variables and Determinants of Poverty during Transition  16 
Ci we estimate a semi-parametric model
12 similar to equation (1) with Qθ(Ci| Xi) instead of 
E(Ci| Xi) and θ є {0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.9}, where Qθ (Ci) denotes the θ
th quantile of total 
household consumption conditional on the explanatory variables Xi. As opposed to the linear 
OLS model where parameters are estimated at the conditional sample mean of the dependent 
variable we now analyze determinants of welfare at specific percentiles of its distribution. The 
estimation  procedure  implies  minimizing  (weighted)  absolute  value  deviations  rather  than 
least squares of deviations and follows a linear programming algorithm. Advantages of this 
estimation strategy can be found in a higher robustness against outliers compared to least-
squares regression and a better consistency performance under weaker stochastic assumptions 
(Koenker and Hallock 2001). 
 
5.5 Differences across households (Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition) 
To specifically explore the potential role of ethnic discrimination in the income generating 
process,  we  decompose  the  gap  in  the  outcome  variable  (household  income)  between 
Ukrainian-speaking  and  non-Ukrainian  speaking  households  with  an  Oaxaca-Blinder-type 
decomposition  (Blinder  1973;  Oaxaca  1973).  Therefore  we  estimate  model  (1)  for  both 
groups of households separately. The differential in mean outcomes of both groups j and k can 
be expressed as 
    R =       xj'bj - xk'bk   =   (xj-xk)'bk  +  xk'(bj-bk)  +  (xj-xk)'(bj-bk) 
           =       E     +       C   +         CE  (3) 
and  can  be  attributed  to  inter-group  differences  in  either  endowments  of  observable 
explanatory variables (x), their returns and remunerations (b) or the interaction effect (CE). 
The proportion unexplained by the endowment effect (E) is due to differences in coefficients, 
which may be interpreted as discrimination (C). It has to be noted that there is no clear answer 
as how to interpret the interaction effect. We therefore report two estimations, first ignoring 
the  interaction  effect  for  the  discrimination  part  (D=1)  and  then  weighting  it  with  the 
population share of the discriminated group (D=F
H). The former result can be seen as a lower 
bound of the size of the discrimination effect.  Since Oaxaca-Blinder-type decompositions 
suffer from path-dependency, i.e. the results differ depending on the base category chosen for 
computing  the  differentials,  we  report  the  discrimination  analysis  in  both  directions  and 
additionally estimate Neumark’s (1988) pooled approach. The latter gives a good indication 
whether  discrimination  remains  after  assuming  away  the  existence  of  a  true,  non-
discriminatory  income  generation  process.  As  a  limitation,  this  approach  compares  both 
                                                 
12 A parametric form is assumed for the deterministic portion of the model but not for the distribution of the error 
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subgroups  j  and  k  at  population  endowment  means  and  can  thus  not  contribute  to  the 




6.1 Incidence and evolution of poverty and inequality over time 
Tables 5 and 6 show indicators characterizing poverty and inequality in Ukraine in 1996 and 
2004. The headcount ratios reflect the share of the poor in the entire population, where „poor” 
households and individuals are those whose consumption and income positions fall below one 
of the three household-specific poverty lines. Not surprisingly, the specification of the poverty 
lines  discussed  above  and  the  choice  of  the  welfare  measure  (household  consumption  or 
income) have a strong effect on the estimates for poverty incidence and severity as well as for 
inequality. Not only do the figures differ across the different poverty measurements for each 
year, but also the conclusions one can draw regarding the evolution of poverty in Ukraine 
over the transition process are highly dependent on the poverty measure and specification 
used.  
Evaluating poverty using household consumption as welfare measure in 1996, we find 11.4% 
of all households below the extreme poverty line and 21.2% below the absolute poverty line 
(including  the  non-food  allowance).  The  corresponding  headcount  ratios  when  using 
household income as welfare measure are much higher, 55.4% and 66.2% respectively. More 
than  half  of  the  population  was  income  poor  in  1996,  however  measured.  The  lower 
consumption poverty levels point to the importance of activities such as subsidiary farming, 
barter  activities,  mutual  help  and  other  activities  in  the  shadow  economy,  which  are 
imperfectly measured. 
When assessing the long-term changes of poverty, we find that extreme consumption poverty 
almost  halved  from  11.4%  to  6.0%.  However,  the  extreme  poverty  line  I  only  evaluates 
whether households can meet their required calorie intake. When considering the absolute 
poverty line IIa that incorporates an allowance for non-food consumption the picture looks 
very  different.  Thus  measured  poverty  actually  increased  from  21.2%  to  22.6%.  We  also 
calculated the headcount ratios for 2004 according to the „original” absolute poverty line 
from 1996 that has been inflated to 2004 prices. According to this poverty line IIb, poverty 
measured by household consumption decreased over time from 21.2% to 7.7%.  Determinants of Poverty during Transition  18 
These  data  indicate  that,  in  the  case  of  Ukraine,  transition  contributed  to  rising  poverty 
through  changes  in  the  composition  of  household  consumption  baskets  and  relative  price 
changes - while the growth experienced in that period actually helped to dampen poverty. In a 
process of transition, it is hence crucial to account for consumption composition and relative 
price effects on the one hand and for the effects of changes in employment and wages when 
assessing changes in living standards over time. For instance, our results are in contrast to 
evidence reported by the World Bank, which found that „Ukraine recorded one of the sharpest 
declines  in  poverty  of  any  transition  economy  in  recent  years”  (World  Bank  2007:  iv). 
However, the estimates used by the World Bank do not account for the transition-induced 
changes in consumption baskets and hence systematically underestimate the true incidence of 
poverty in Ukraine. 
In contrast to the mixed evidence for consumption poverty, the evolution of income poverty is 
much clearer: the share of the population falling below the poverty line is decreasing, but 
remains at a high level of 47.9% when considering the absolute poverty line IIa and drops to 
28.4% with poverty line IIb. 
The huge discrepancy between the poverty figures related to income and consumption found 
in 1996 becomes smaller in 2004, which is in line with ongoing market oriented reforms and 
increasing  „formalization”  and  „monetization”  of  income  earning  activities  and  incomes, 
typical  for  transition  economies.  Furthermore,  as  the  difference  between  poverty  rates 
measured with poverty lines IIa and IIb shows, growth and transition in Ukraine was not 
unambiguously pro-poor. The income data confirms that the rise in poverty is mainly due to 
the changes in relative prices rather than to declining real wages. 
Our findings on inequality of consumption and income (Table 6) correspond to the general 
findings on poverty: the Gini coefficients show a strong decrease of inequality in income (still 
at a rather high level of 0.375 in 2004) while consumption inequality has remained stable over 
the  period  at  around  0.29.  The  former  may  in  part  reflect  advances  in  the  positions  of 
pensioners,  as  compared  to  income  earners.  Again,  the  „formalization”  of  incomes  might 
drive these results to a large extent thus calling into question the extent to which growth and 
transition really are inequality reducing, if these results depend in part on the reduction of 
measurement errors. 
Table 7 shows the poverty profiles for 1996 and 2004, indicating the poverty headcount ratios 
for different subgroups and thus giving a more detailed, albeit still rough picture on poverty 
trends. Very large households and households consisting only of persons in pension age are 
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single  parent  families,  which  are  much  worse  of  in  2004.  These  basic  figures  illustrate 
furthermore  huge  discrepancies  in  poverty  rates  between  different  regions  and  settlement 
types in Ukraine and considerable changes in their relative position over the years: whereas 
the  population  in  Kiev  is  generally  doing  better  in  both  years,  the  West,  which  is  more 
advantaged in 1996, is much worse off in 2004, while the opposite is true for the East. The 
situation of villages, doing much better than urban areas in terms of consumption, but much 
worse in terms of income in 1996, deteriorates: in 2004 rural areas have much lower income 
as well as in consumption levels. This points the significant role of rural informal coping 
strategies in times of economic crises. However, the same strategies are not suitable to long-
term welfare growth hence representing a potential poverty trap. 
Poverty rates also differ substantially by households being exposed to different types of labor 
market shocks: the high poverty rates among households having members on forced leave 
from work are especially high in 1996 and point to the phenomenon of „working poor” during 
the early years of transition. In 2004 in contrast, the highest poverty rates are found among 
households having at least one unemployed member. 
Tables 8 and 9 give more insights into the distribution and incidence of the labor market 
shocks in 1996 and 2004. In the early transition period labor market shocks were almost 
randomly  distributed  among  poor  and  non-poor  households,  highlighting  the  universal 
character  of  the  transition  shock  (Table  8):  While  unemployment  and  forced  leaves  were 
associated with poor households, the incidence of wage arrears was surprisingly significantly 
higher  among  non-poor  households.  In  2004,  the  only  characteristic  that  was  different 
between  the  two  groups  of  households  was  unemployment,  with  poor  households  being 
significantly  more  affected.  This  is  in  line  with  the  observation  that  the  adjustment 
mechanisms in the labor market were different in the two phases of the transition process and 
lends  some  support  to  our  hypothesis  that  unemployment  became  an  important  poverty 
determinant by 2004. 
As  the  industrial  structure  differs  across  different  types  of  settlements  in  Ukraine,  the 
geographical  distribution  of  the  transition  shock  may  be  very  uneven.  In  particular,  the 
economies  of  so-called  single  enterprise  towns  could  be  affected  very  substantially  by  a 
strong negative shock in a single industry. Table 9 shows a strong geographic component in 
the variation of the incidence of in-kind payments and unemployment in both years. The latter 
increased in all settlement types between 1996 and 2004 with the strongest increase in the 
rural areas, possibly because of a delayed enterprise restructuring in the agrarian sector. The 
incidence of in-kind payments as well as other labor market shocks considered in this paper Determinants of Poverty during Transition  20 
decreased between 1996 and 2004, but was still substantial in rural areas in 2004. Overall, this 
evidence points to the hypothesis of the relative welfare improvement in big cities during 
transition with towns and rural areas being the relative losers of the transition process.  
 
6.2 Multivariate regression results 
OLS and probit regressions: Table 10 shows regression results for determinants of household 
welfare in 1996 and 2004 measured by household consumption and income in terms of July 
2004 Ukrainian hryvnias.
13 We also analyze the probabilities of falling into poverty defined 
by the household specific absolute poverty line with regional price adjustments (Table 11).
14 
The number of observations differs slightly between the different specifications due to limited 
information on some variables or implausible zero income values. The relevant goodness-of-
fit statistics (R² and pseudo R²) indicate a reasonably good fit for all our model specifications. 
In all analysis we tested for the joint significance of all restructuring variables and found that 
the  shocks  are  jointly  significant  on  the  1%  level  in  all  cases  (except  for  the  quantile 
regressions, where in two cases they are only significant at the 10% and 5% level). Finally, 
there is no indication for multicollinearity impeding the precision of our results as indicated 
by a variance inflation factor test (results not shown). 
We generally find strong effects of household composition on household welfare. The share 
of children exhibits negative and significant coefficient. Moreover, the analysis shows that the 
inverse  link  between  the  share  of  children  and  household  welfare  strengthened  in  2004  . 
Compared to the omitted age bracket between 26 and 40 years, all other age groups fare worse 
in terms of consumption in the year 2004. Juveniles are the only exception and even had 
higher consumption in 1996. Households consisting only of economically inactive members 
were significantly (and increasingly) worse off over the course of transition. Having a larger 
share of household members in the pension age significantly lowers consumption in both 
years. But it does not increase the probability to become consumption poor as indicated in the 
probit regression. 
In fact, larger share of elderly reduces the risk of income poverty in 2004. This surprising 
finding  might  be  attributable  to  strong  pension  increases  and  is  in  line  with  the  view 
expressed  by  the  World  Bank  (2005)  that  elderly  may  positively  contribute  to  household 
income (column 4 in Table 11). 
                                                 
13 The following results reflect unweighted household data. 
14  As  a  robustness  check  we  repeat  the  probit  analysis  with  the  alternative  absolute  poverty  line  and  find 
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We find strong gender effects. Female-only households appear to have suffered from lower 
income  levels  in  1996,  but  in  2004  this  effect  has  almost  halved.  At  the  same  time,  the 
consumption  gap  gained  significance  with  female  households  lagging  behind  by  12%. 
Overall,  the  results  for  gender  and  age  groups  provide  evidence  of  growing  social 
stratification between 1996 and 2004. The lower levels of such stratification in 1996 was due 
to the universal nature of the initial transition shock that affected nearly all households in the 
country  as  well  as  to  the  socialist  egalitarian  system,  which  had  widely  leveled  out 
endowments and opportunities. However, declining overall inequality may mask rising inter-
group inequality, which in turn may be due to specific economic problems faced by some 
socio-economic groups. 
The importance of education for household welfare increased during transition as shown by 
the rise in the coefficients’ magnitude and significance in 2004 compared with 1996. The gain 
associated  with  an  additional  year  of  schooling  raised  from  2.5%  to  4.1%  of  the  mean 
consumption level. The increasing importance of education as a safeguard against poverty in 
Ukraine is also consistent with findings of increasing returns to human capital in Ukraine and 
other  transition  countries  (Munich,  Svejnar  and  Terrell  2005).  Access  to  land  was  an 
important  contributor  to  household  consumption  in  both  1996  and  2004,  and  apparently 
stronger in 1996. As markets regained stability and more options for cash generation became 
available, subsistence agriculture – which required access to land –diminished in importance. 
Lagged ownership of a car, which can potentially be used as a productive asset, exhibits a 
stable and highly significant positive contribution to the level of household welfare.
15 
We also find strong effects of the geographical location of households on their welfare. This 
is true of settlement types as well as macro-regions. Households in urban settlements could 
generally  enjoy  higher  income  levels  than  rural  households;  however,  the  result  is 
insignificant for consumption. This presumably reflects problems with supplying towns and 
cities with food after a considerable decline in agricultural production in the early transition 
period along with rising food prices (cp. Swinnen 2002). Households residing in large cities 
clearly were the relative winners during transition – having significantly higher income levels 
and lower poverty risks than rural households and households located in towns. 
An interesting welfare pattern arises on the macro-regional level. While households in the 
(predominantly Ukrainian-speaking) Western part had a clear welfare advantage during the 
dawn of transition, it was completely lost by 2004 while the East improved substantially in 
                                                 
15 This lagged variable reduces the number of observations due to sample enlargement between 1995 and 1996. 
As a robustness check, we re-estimate the regressions omitting the lagged car ownership variable and find the 
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terms of income. The capital of Kiev has had a significant welfare advantage throughout the 
whole period. Note that this effect is independent of ethnicity which was controlled as well 
(see below). 
Of special interest are the transition specific labor market shocks in the regression equations.
16 
While wage arrears naturally reduced household income in both years, the receipt of in-kind 
payment appears to have been positively associated with consumption and income in 1996. 
The latter result is counterintuitive, but possibly points to the fact that households which 
received in-kind payments were generating at least some labor income. As in-kind payments 
constituted only a part of income, cash was received, too. Forced leave and unemployment 
played a significant role in the determination of welfare at the beginning of transition. By 
2004,  when  the  restructuring  process  accelerated  and  (formal)  unemployment  became 
widespread, unemployment became the most important and highly significant labor market 
determinant  of  welfare  (columns  3  and  4  in  Tables  10  and  11).  For  example,  the  shock 
variables  show  that  the  probability  of  being  poor  in  1996  was  15  to  19%  higher  for 
households with at least one member on forced leave. In 2004, unemployment constitutes the 
main  labor  market  risk  of  falling  into  poverty,  with  at  least  one  unemployed  household 
member  increasing  the  probability  of  being  income  poor  by  29.9%.  The  low  level  of 
significance  for  non-standard  forms  of  unemployment  in  2004  can  have  two  statistical 
explanations. First, some shocks became quite rare (for example forced leaves), leading to 
large standard errors. Second, the fraction of „missing household income” due to these shocks 
decreased from 1996 to 2004 since the experience of cumulative shocks inside the household 
was dramatically reduced. The share of households with at least two household members 
suffering income losses dropped from one third in 1996 to 3.8% in 2004. At a smaller scale, 
similar trends are observable for in-kind payment and forced leave. 
The  regression  evidence  confirms  the  link  between  the  transition  process,  labor  market 
adjustments mechanisms and the evolution of poverty in Ukraine. For example, the lesser 
importance of unemployment in 1996 is consistent with the fact that being employed did not 
necessarily imply higher income as arrears, unpaid leave, etc. were widespread. Over time, 
the Ukrainian labor market moved from non-standard adjustment mechanisms via arrears, in-
kind payments and forced leave towards adjustment via unemployment (Ganguli and Terrell 
2006; Kupets 2006). 
                                                 
16 We are aware of the potential endogeneity of our transition shock variables. As a robustness check we run the 
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Quantile regressions: Further insights into the determinants of household poverty over the 
welfare distribution (measured by household consumption) are given by the results of the 
quantile regressions (Table 12). The pseudo R² for these regressions, which reports the share 
of absolute median deviations explained by the model, is between 0.30 and 0.33 in 1996 and 
0.23 and 0.26 for 2004 showing a reasonable good fit of our estimation. 
The first remarkable result concerns female-only households. In both 1996 and 2004, those 
households were associated with significantly lower consumption. However, in 1996 this was 
true at higher quantiles of the consumption distribution only. Thus, for less well-off and poor 
households the gender factor was of minor importance in the early transition phase. In 2004, 
the gender effect increased with consumption deciles. Overall, this result suggests a growing 
gender  gap  in  poverty  between  1996  and  2004.  This  evidence  of  marked  differences  in 
material well-being between men and women confirms to previous work on the gender wage 
gap in Ukraine (Ganguli and Terrell 2006). 
Elderly members of the household were associated with lower household consumption in 
1996, though the result is significant only at the top end of the distribution. In 2004, a higher 
share of elderly members drove household consumption down at all but the lowest quantiles, 
with the effect especially gaining strength in the middle of the distribution. As with the OLS 
and probit results, having more children was negatively related to household consumption in 
2004 across the quantiles. In 1996, children had little effect on consumption throughout the 
entire distribution. 
The quantile regressions provide evidence of a highly positive impact of access to land in the 
lower quantiles of the consumption distribution in 1996 compared to 2004, indicating a more 
important role of subsistence agriculture for the poorest households in the early transition 
period. In terms of geographical locations, the quantile regressions confirm strong regional 
patterns in consumption as reported above. In 1996, households in cities had significantly 
lower  consumption  at  higher  quantiles.  In  combination  with  our  above  results,  this  is 
consistent with findings from other transition countries that rural households are more likely 
to be income poor, while urban households were more likely to be consumption poor (Knight 
and Shi 2006). We also observe a positive and significant effect for households in the capital 
Kiev compared to households residing in the Center in both 1996 and 2004, though in 1996 it 
was only significant at higher quantiles. Overall, these results testify to changing urban-rural 
divide, with better-off urban households benefiting disproportionally from the rapid economic 
growth prior to 2004. Another remarkable result is that households in Western regions of 
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percentiles) in terms of consumption between 1996 and 2004, the result being robust in all 
parts of the consumption distribution. 
The significant and negative effect of forced unpaid leave on welfare were particularly strong 
in  the  bottom  quantile  of  the  distribution  in  1996,  while  the  significant  effect  of 
unemployment  was  especially  detrimental  for  households  at  higher  quantiles  of  the 
distribution.  In  2004,  the  effects  of  forced  leave  almost  entirely  disappeared,  while 
unemployment had increasingly negative effects with higher positions in the consumption 
distribution.  As  the  quantile  regression  shows,  the  significant  positive  effect  of  in-kind 
income on consumption in 1996 remains limited to the top 10% of the distribution while the 
impact is not different from zero for other households. We conclude that labor market shocks 
are not only time specific, but also differ in their impact on households depending on the 
welfare position. 
Oaxaca-Blinder  decomposition:  Ukrainian-speaking  households  faced  significantly  lower 
incomes in 2004 and a higher probability of being income poor in both years. To explore 
whether this is an indication of ethnic discrimination, we decomposed the differences between 
two  separate  regressions  for  Russian-speaking  (supposed  to  be  non-discriminated)  and 
Ukrainian-speaking  households  (supposed  to  be  discriminated)  into  endowment  and 
discrimination  effect  (Table  13).  For  1996,  the  differences  due  to  discrimination  are  not 
significantly different from zero. Depending on the methodology employed, it turns out that 
in 2004 a highly significant 70% of the difference can be attributed to different endowments 
of Russian-speaking compared to Ukrainian-speaking households, while the discrimination 
effect explains about 30% of the variation. This result is confirmed by the pooled approach.  
 
7. Conclusions 
Our  paper  analyzed  the  incidence  and  determinants  of  household  poverty  at  times  of 
economic  decline  and  recovery,  paying  particular  attention  to  specific  transmission 
mechanisms of economic transition to various types of household poverty and inequality. We 
used comparable household survey evidence from Ukraine from 1996 and 2004, two years 
representative of the contracting and expanding phases of the transition process, respectively. 
This analysis yields important insights into six issues. 
First, there is substantial evidence of some decline in both poverty and inequality over the 
eight-year period of analysis in Ukraine, especially when measured by income. Progress in 
the reduction in consumption poverty and inequality is much more limited. However, our Determinants of Poverty during Transition  25 
work also shows the sensitivity of the poverty estimates to the choice of welfare indicator and 
poverty line. The literature on Ukraine and on transition generally has to be more aware of the 
limitations of narrow welfare indicators. We caution policy makers to rely too heavily on too 
few welfare indicators to assess the welfare and distributional impact of their work. 
Second, the transition in Ukraine has seen an increase in socio-economic stratification over 
time (and across space, as we will conclude below). We expected to find a widening gender 
gap in welfare and this held in general. However, we observed less gender inequality than we 
had feared. Female-only households, for example, had lower consumption and income but 
were not more likely to be poor in both years. Other household characteristics also mattered. 
The  poverty  risk  associated  with  children  was  a  clear  empirical  finding  and  raises  an 
important area for future policy action. The analysis suggests that the new labor markets place 
a diminishing premium on having experienced the Soviet economy, which may raise the risk 
of unemployment for older workers in the later phase of transition. We also expected more 
education to have a positive effect on welfare. This we did find, with the added twists that 
returns to education rose over time and that education paid higher returns for the worse-off 
households, which is in contrast to a study for Russia in the 1990s (Cheidvasser and Benítez-
Silva 2007) but in accordance with competing but thorough evidence for Russia and Hungary 
(Flabbi, Paternostro and Tiongson 2007). In line with these authors, our finding may indicate 
a way for pro-poor growth through investments in human capital. 
Third, we accounted explicitly for the transmission mechanisms of the transition process by 
including specific shock variables such as wage arrears and forced leave. As expected, we 
found these variables to be more important in the earlier period, when the observed magnitude 
of these variables was also much higher. In the recovery phase of transition, unemployment 
became a risk factor for poverty, just as it is in OECD economies. We plan to account better 
for the potential endogeneity problems related to the shock variables in future work. 
Fourth, we expected that household welfare in the earlier period of transition would depend 
on the existence of asset endowments like land. In fact, the analysis reveals that land access 
mattered  for  household  welfare  in  both  years,  especially  for  poorer  people.  This  result 
motivates us to study land-based coping strategies of households in transition economies in 
more detail in future work. 
Fifth, our emphasis on spatial differentiation (in addition to the temporal issues discussed 
above) revealed that the location of a household mattered significantly for its welfare. City 
dwellers were the winners of the transition process, especially those city dwellers already in 
the upper end of the welfare distribution. Furthermore, households in the East of the country Determinants of Poverty during Transition  26 
gained while households in the West lost economically over time. Perhaps this finding also 
helps to explain part of the motivation of Ukrainians to participate in the Orange Revolution, 
which polarized the country along similar geographical lines. The effects of location should 
be of interest to politicians as these effects may signal a lack of national market integration 
and insufficient labor mobility across the country. 
Finally,  we  found  some  presence  of  ethnic  discrimination  against  Ukrainian-speaking 
households (controlling for macro regions) in the income generating process in the year 2004. 
As above, this could have potentially contributed to the outbreak of the Orange Revolution.  
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Appendix 
 
Table 1: Output and employment indicators for Ukraine 
 
      1989 1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 2004 
Real GDP (index, 1989 = 100)    100  96.6  86.4  78.0  66.9  51.6  45.3  40.8  39.5  38.8  38.7  41.0  44.8  47.1  51.5  57.8 
Real wages (index, 1989 = 100)    100  109.3  114.2  123.7  63.2  56.5  62.3  59.3  57.7  55.7  48.4  48.9  59.0  70.8  82.7  96.7 
Employment ratio  
(number of employed as % of population aged 15 59) 
 
a 
83.2  81.9  80.5  78.5  76.2  73.1  76.8  77.2  76.7  74.9  65.3  66.3  66.2  67.0  66.9  67.0 
Annual unemployment rate  
(average % of the labor force) 
 
b 
.  .  .  .  .  .  5.6  7.6  8.9  11.3  11.9  11.7  11.1  10.1  9.1  8.6 
Source: TransMONEE (2005)                       
a. Data for 1989 1994 taken from CIS Stat (2001); data since 1995 based on labor force survey.                   
b. Based on labor force survey; data for 1995 1997 as of October; 1998 as of November; 1999 2004 year average.                
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Table 2: Overview over household surveys in Ukraine 
 
  Ukraine-96  ULMS 2004 
Period of data  
collection  
June August 1996  June October 2004 
Sampling method 
Multistage random sampling with 
probability proportional to size PPS: 24 
oblasts plus AR Crimea; settlements 
(rural) and rajons (urban) 
Multistage random sampling with 
probability proportional to size PPS: 24 
oblasts plus AR Crimea; settlements 
(rural) and rajons (urban) 
Sample population 
households and all working age adults 
aged 15 years and older, excluding 
persons in the army, in prison or under 
medical treatment 
households and all working age adults 
aged 15 72 years, excluding persons in the 
army, in prison or under medical 
treatment 




Individual information  education, employment, unemployment, 
incomes 
education, employment, unemployment, 
incomes 
Household information 
demographic structure of the household, 
assets, income, expenditure, subsistence 
agriculture 
demographic structure of the household, 
assets, income, expenditure, subsistence 
agriculture 
Source: Technical Report KIIS, 1996 and 2004  
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Table 3: Overview over variables 
 
  1996    2004 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max    Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
                       
consumption  1485  658.22  455.11  13.86  3,984    3381  863.36  560.62  34.09  5,999 
income  1414  362.19  603.83  0  12,047    3267  650.49  611.54  0  14,985 
household size  1485  3.17  1.55  1  11    3381  2.93  1.34  1  13 
share of children  1485  0.14  0.19  0  0.67    3381  0.09  0.16  0  0.75 
share 15 25 yrs  1485  0.12  0.18  0  1    3381  0.15  0.21  0  1 
share 26 40 yrs  1485  0.17  0.23  0  1    3381  0.17  0.24  0  1 
share 41 yrs pension age  1485  0.21  0.28  0  1    3381  0.26  0.32  0  1 
share pension age  1485  0.36  0.40  0  1    3381  0.33  0.40  0  1 
female only household  1485  0.13  0.34  0  1    3381  0.14  0.34  0  1 
average yrs schooling  1485  10.41  2.88  4  15    3381  11.10  2.32  4  15 
Ukrainian speaking  1485  0.51  0.50  0  1    3381  0.49  0.50  0  1 
carown  1485  0.17  0.38  0  1    3381  0.21  0.41  0  1 
access to land  1485  0.77  0.42  0  1    3381  0.75  0.43  0  1 
inactive  1485  0.27  0.45  0  1    3381  0.28  0.45  0  1 
arrears  1485  0.47  0.50  0  1    3381  0.07  0.25  0  1 
inkind  1485  0.11  0.31  0  1    3381  0.01  0.12  0  1 
leave  1485  0.05  0.21  0  1    3381  0.01  0.10  0  1 
unemploy  1485  0.11  0.31  0  1    3381  0.15  0.36  0  1 
village  1485  0.39  0.49  0  1    3381  0.34  0.47  0  1 
town  1485  0.20  0.40  0  1    3381  0.27  0.45  0  1 
city  1485  0.41  0.49  0  1    3381  0.39  0.49  0  1 
Kiev  1485  0.03  0.17  0  1    3381  0.04  0.20  0  1 
West  1485  0.23  0.42  0  1    3381  0.21  0.41  0  1 
East  1485  0.22  0.41  0  1    3381  0.23  0.42  0  1 
Center  1485  0.26  0.44  0  1    3381  0.27  0.45  0  1 
South  1485  0.26  0.44  0  1    3381  0.24  0.43  0  1 
Source: Ukraine 96 and ULMS 2004, authors’ calculations. 
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Table 4: Examples of poverty lines for certain types of households  
                (monthly allowances for entire household, July 2004 hryvnias) 
 
  1996  2004 
  
Extreme 











Example 1:  
Single household, male,  
aged 19 60 
116.58  147.57  138.49  209.86 
         
Example 2:  
Household with two adults  
(aged 19 60), one 14 year old girl 
299.78  379.48  356.13  539.64 
* incl. non-food allowance of 21% for 1996, 34% for 2004  






Table 5: Poverty headcount ratios and other FGT poverty indicators 
 
     
Poverty line  Extreme  
poverty line I 
Absolute poverty 
line IIa 
Absolute poverty line IIb 
from 1996;  
in 2004 hryvnia 
             
  Cons  Inc  Cons  Inc  Cons  Inc 
1996             
Headcount (%)  11.35  55.37  21.15  66.22  21.15  66.22 
Poverty gap (a=1)  0.03  0.29  0.06  0.36  0.06  0.36 
Squared poverty gap (a=2)  0.01  0.20  0.02  0.25  0.02  0.25 
2004             
Headcount (%)  6.04  25.49  22.64  47.86  7.71  28.41 
Poverty gap (a=1)  0.01  0.09  0.06  0.18  0.02  0.10 
Squared poverty gap (a=2)  0.00  0.05  0.02  0.10  0.01  0.05 






Table 6: Measures of inequality 
 






      1996  2004  1996  2004 
Gini coefficient  excluding „0“  0.291  0.290  0.465  0.375 
  trimmed*   0.274  0.270  0.416  0.345 
Polarization p90/p10  excluding „0“  3.92  3.80  9.41  5.53 
   trimmed*   3.76  3.59  8.98  5.33 
* excluding 1/99 percentiles 
Source: Ukraine 96 and ULMS 2004, authors’ calculations. Figures according to per capita household 
consumption and income, weighted by household size. 
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Table 7: Poverty headcount ratios (%) and distribution of subgroups in sample (%) 
 
                 
  
Absolute poverty line IIa 
Absolute poverty 






Year  1996  2004  2004  1996  2004 
Welfare measure  cons.  inc.  cons.  inc.  cons.  inc.       
Entire sample  21.15  66.22  22.64  47.86  7.71  28.41   100  100 
Household size                 
1  16.29  55.39  11.71  26.12  3.98  10.12  5.13  4.25 
2  18.89  61.29  14.23  39.06  3.84  19.00  18.45  21.24 
3  18.97  59.37  18.40  43.81  6.32  26.95  19.92  26.94 
4  20.55  67.00  26.09  49.59  9.78  29.59  24.85  25.59 
5  20.72  71.09  33.33  63.04  11.11  39.57  15.85  12.07 
6+  28.93  79.44  35.04  65.80  11.95  45.39  15.8  9.9 
Household types                         
Only adults in working age  18.89  61.29  14.23  39.06  3.84  21.39  9.58  20.47 
HH with one child  18.97  59.37  18.40  43.81  6.32  30.79  16.45  18.85 
HH with children (>1)  20.55  67.00  26.09  49.59  9.78  44.82  19.62  11.85 
Single parent families  20.72  71.09  33.33  63.04  11.11  37.56  1.71  2.05 
Pensioners only  28.93  79.44  35.04  65.80  11.95  11.71  13.81  11.4 
Other households  25.46  71.74  28.09  52.55  9.30  30.98  38.82  35.39 
Regional differences                         
Kiev  17.59  30.51  11.11  25.37  5.78  15.12  4.14  4.50 
Centre  21.66  70.56  20.50  56.15  6.20  35.29  24.92  26.28 
West  11.87  66.11  28.04  59.45  9.46  37.19  27.92  24.27 
East  34.02  69.11  22.53  33.33  8.66  18.77  18.84  21.84 
South  21.56  66.08  21.80  44.67  7.09  23.38  24.18  23.11 
Settlement type                         
Village  13.15  77.99  24.19  63.74  7.27  42.26  38.02  35.66 
Town  25.62  69.81  22.48  46.82  9.26  25.87  17.78  26.33 
City  26.06  54.30  21.33  33.68  7.07  17.23  44.2  38.01 
Economic shocks and labor market information                
At least 1 household 
member experiences                 
in kind payments  17.03  64.38  21.30  67.07  7.69  50.90  11.83  1.68 
wage arrears  18.67  69.24  21.10  53.25  8.22  37.99  52.00  7.28 
forced leave  35.61  81.77  23.53  34.34  6.86  28.28  6.06  1.04 
unemployment  29.42  68.05  30.42  68.03  9.80  51.93  12.91  17.73 
Household is inactive on 
labor market  23.36  71.21  24.82  55.40  7.87  28.56  19.95  19.84 
Source: Ukraine 96 and ULMS 2004, authors’ calculations. Headcount ratios, weighted by household size. 
 Determinants of Poverty during Transition  36 
 
Table 8: Incidence of standard and non standard forms of unemployment by poverty status 
 
  1996    2004 
  non poor  poorΨ  t test    non poor  poorΨ  t test 
unemployment (ILO)  9.39%  15.40%  ***    13.41%  21.63%  *** 
wage arrears  47.12%  41.41%  **    6.731%  6.13%   
payment in kind  10.12%  8.33%      1.42%  1.38%   
forced leave  3.93%  8.33%  ***    0.94%  0.92%   
Source: Ukraine 96 and ULMS 2004, authors’ calculations. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 






Table 9: Incidence of standard and non standard forms of unemployment by settlement type 
 
  1996  2004 
  village  town  city  village  town  city 
unemployment (ILO)  6.8%  10.8%  10.1%  15.8%  16.2%  11.7% 
wage arrears  44.4%  39.0%  38.3%  5.9%  5.9%  4.8% 
payment in kind  13.7%  7.8%  5.1%  7.7%  3.4%  0.6% 
forced leave  5.5%  4.3%  5.0%  0.5%  0.6%  0.8% 
Source: Ukraine 96 and ULMS 2004, authors’ calculations. 
 Determinants of Poverty during Transition  37 
 
Table 10: OLS regressions: Household consumption and income 
 
                        1996  2004 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 








Log of household size  0.583  0.451  0.571  0.625 
  (12.58)***  (4.97)***  (21.08)***  (18.37)*** 
Share of children in household   0.044   0.668   0.372   0.765 
  (0.35)  (2.39)**  (4.67)***  (7.20)*** 
Share of age 15 25  0.270  0.193  0.005   0.039 
  (2.83)***  (0.95)  (0.10)  (0.53) 
Share of age 41 pension age   0.087   0.153   0.140   0.057 
  (1.19)  (1.03)  (3.37)***  (1.07) 
 0.132  0.014   0.175  0.042  Share of pension aged in household  
(f: 55+ m: 60+)  (1.74)*  (0.09)  (4.04)***  (0.76) 
 0.074   0.284   0.123   0.171  Household with only women  
and children (<15)  (1.52)  (3.57)***  (4.27)***  (5.09)*** 
Average years of schooling (15 72)  0.026  0.054  0.041  0.050 
  (4.89)***  (6.55)***  (10.49)***  (10.88)*** 
Ukrainian is preferred language  0.038  0.031  0.004   0.113 
  (0.97)  (0.45)  (0.15)  (3.74)*** 
Lagged car ownership  0.158  0.199  0.181  0.139 
  (4.68)***  (2.90)***  (8.52)***  (5.04)*** 
Land access  0.244  0.082  0.120  0.035 
  (6.16)***  (1.32)  (5.42)***  (1.28) 
Inactive   0.173   0.417   0.192   0.424 
  (3.52)***  (5.33)***  (7.55)***  (13.70)*** 
Wage arrears   0.009   0.252  0.001   0.125 
  (0.29)  (4.04)***  (0.04)  (2.51)** 
In kind income  0.087  0.270   0.106   0.114 
  (2.12)**  (3.27)***  (1.61)  (1.15) 
Forced leave   0.251   0.579   0.046   0.172 
  (3.71)***  (4.31)***  (0.57)  (1.26) 
Unemployment   0.145   0.073   0.179   0.496 
  (3.17)***  (0.94)  (7.63)***  (14.97)*** 
Town (OV: Village)   0.051  0.331   0.022  0.091 
  (1.47)  (5.22)***  (0.97)  (3.17)*** 
City   0.071  0.362  0.020  0.253 
  (1.98)**  (5.24)***  (0.82)  (8.46)*** 
Kiev (OV: Center)  0.278  0.708  0.316  0.292 
  (3.10)***  (4.75)***  (7.28)***  (4.74)*** 
West  0.168  0.105   0.041  0.046 
  (4.84)***  (1.40)  (1.74)*  (1.48) 
East   0.061  0.016   0.021  0.138 
  (1.16)  (0.18)  (0.73)  (4.09)*** 
South  0.114  0.188  0.022  0.051 
  (2.75)***  (2.38)**  (0.87)  (1.54) 
Constant  5.261  4.437  5.654  5.160 
  (46.90)***  (21.47)***  (82.06)***  (59.22)*** 
Observations  1485  1293  3381  3248 
R squared  0.51  0.28  0.44  0.43 
Wald test, 
arrears=inkind=leave=unemploy=0 
8.29  10.90  15.07  59.29 
Prob > F  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Robust t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: Ukraine 96 and ULMS 2004, authors’ calculations. 
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Table 11: Probit regressions of being consumption or income poor (marginal effects) 
 
                     
                      1996  2004 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Consumption 
poor  Income poor  Consumption 
poor  Income poor 
Log of household size  0.190  0.227  0.179  0.260 
  (5.26)***  (4.87)***  (7.92)***  (8.23)*** 
Share of children in household   0.152   0.028   0.046  0.223 
  (1.53)  (0.21)  (0.71)  (2.47)** 
Share of age 15 25   0.191   0.195   0.035   0.084 
  (2.51)**  (1.99)**  (0.78)  (1.32) 
Share of age 41 pension age  0.013   0.014  0.024  0.055 
  (0.23)  (0.21)  (0.69)  (1.22) 
 0.028   0.150   0.017   0.133  Share of pension aged in household  
(f: 55+ m: 60+)  (0.47)  (1.96)**  (0.45)  (2.67)*** 
 0.035  0.021   0.024   0.020  Household with only women  
and children (<15)  (0.94)  (0.43)  (0.93)  (0.58) 
Average years of schooling (15 72)   0.017   0.029   0.021   0.040 
  (4.04)***  (5.45)***  (6.47)***  (8.73)*** 
Ukrainian is preferred language   0.085  0.077   0.012  0.075 
  (2.69)***  (1.96)**  (0.58)  (2.82)*** 
Lagged car ownership   0.081   0.139   0.060   0.079 
  (3.13)***  (3.80)***  (3.64)***  (3.35)*** 
Land access   0.151   0.033   0.088   0.045 
  (4.97)***  (0.91)  (4.60)***  (1.74)* 
Inactive  0.067  0.195  0.091  0.300 
  (1.83)*  (4.56)***  (4.07)***  (10.16)*** 
Wage arrears   0.031  0.070   0.013  0.069 
  (1.25)  (2.15)**  (0.47)  (1.77)* 
In kind income   0.019   0.121   0.016  0.093 
  (0.54)  (2.63)***  (0.29)  (1.19) 
Forced leave  0.155  0.191  0.007   0.085 
  (2.93)***  (3.22)***  (0.10)  (0.88) 
Unemployment  0.075  0.024  0.089  0.299 
  (2.14)**  (0.53)  (4.48)***  (10.88)*** 
Town (OV: Village)  0.023   0.139  0.014   0.079 
  (0.77)  (3.64)***  (0.78)  (3.20)*** 
City  0.053   0.164  0.009   0.170 
  (1.77)*  (4.32)***  (0.44)  (6.35)*** 
Kiev (OV: Center)   0.099   0.184   0.105   0.090 
  (1.97)**  (2.04)**  (3.02)***  (1.58) 
West   0.115   0.114  0.042   0.011 
  (4.32)***  (2.84)***  (2.05)**  (0.40) 
East  0.027  0.122  0.016   0.119 
  (0.72)  (2.64)***  (0.69)  (3.85)*** 
South   0.062  0.016   0.024   0.031 
  (1.94)*  (0.38)  (1.11)  (1.03) 
Observations  1485  1415  3381  3267 
Pseudo R squared  0.14  0.11  0.08  0.17 
Test: 
arrears=inkind=leave=unemploy=0 
18.989  19.745  20.601  123.308 
Robust z statistics in parentheses;  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: Ukraine 96 and ULMS 2004, authors’ calculations. 
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Table 12: Quantile regression, dependent variable: log of household consumption 
                                                                                    1996  2004 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
  10th percentile  25th percentile  50th percentile  75th percentile  90th percentile  10th percentile  25th percentile  50th percentile  75th percentile  90th percentile 
Log of household size  0.796  0.545  0.504  0.534  0.554  0.622  0.624  0.563  0.526  0.511 
  (9.45)***  (6.81)***  (10.11)***  (8.57)***  (7.12)***  (11.64)***  (16.51)***  (17.00)***  (15.76)***  (12.93)*** 
 0.202   0.192  0.053  0.040   0.113   0.364   0.469   0.374   0.372   0.168  Share of children in 
household  (0.75)  (0.80)  (0.37)  (0.24)  (0.57)  (2.25)**  (4.17)***  (3.83)***  (3.85)***  (1.46) 
Share of age 15 25  0.207  0.325  0.308  0.320  0.150  0.027   0.031   0.061   0.010  0.160 
  (1.11)  (1.85)*  (2.90)***  (2.46)**  (0.96)  (0.25)  (0.41)  (0.90)  (0.14)  (1.88)* 
 0.106   0.151  0.027   0.056   0.158   0.102   0.166   0.146   0.131   0.081  Share of age 41 pension age 
(0.74)  (1.21)  (0.35)  (0.62)  (1.43)  (1.23)  (2.97)***  (2.95)***  (2.67)***  (1.37) 
 0.010   0.178   0.095   0.137   0.362   0.076   0.128   0.230   0.214   0.196  Share of pension aged in 
household (f: 55+ m: 60+)  (0.06)  (1.33)  (1.13)  (1.38)  (3.11)***  (0.84)  (2.13)**  (4.31)***  (4.00)***  (3.05)*** 
 0.039   0.037   0.133   0.125   0.087   0.073   0.100   0.130   0.159   0.190  Household with only women 
and children (<15)  (0.40)  (0.41)  (2.41)**  (1.88)*  (1.05)  (1.21)  (2.37)**  (3.47)***  (4.31)***  (4.34)*** 
0.033  0.022  0.021  0.022  0.020  0.039  0.046  0.040  0.035  0.034  Average years of schooling 
(15 72)  (2.82)***  (2.30)**  (3.59)***  (3.20)***  (2.33)**  (4.97)***  (8.28)***  (8.11)***  (7.05)***  (5.44)*** 
0.107  0.119  0.056   0.016   0.083  0.023  0.038  0.007   0.012   0.004  Ukrainian is preferred 
language  (1.35)  (1.61)  (1.29)  (0.31)  (1.24)  (0.46)  (1.09)  (0.22)  (0.42)  (0.13) 
Lagged car ownership  0.163  0.180  0.141  0.156  0.201  0.140  0.151  0.184  0.180  0.186 
  (2.18)**  (2.81)***  (3.62)***  (3.35)***  (3.49)***  (3.18)***  (5.14)***  (7.04)***  (6.94)***  (6.10)*** 
Land access  0.351  0.306  0.201  0.148  0.072  0.130  0.144  0.132  0.117  0.099 
  (4.50)***  (4.41)***  (4.91)***  (3.12)***  (1.29)  (2.82)***  (4.54)***  (4.75)***  (4.33)***  (3.08)*** 
Inactive   0.096   0.171   0.169   0.140   0.035   0.188   0.204   0.179   0.180   0.171 
  (0.96)  (2.02)**  (3.33)***  (2.30)**  (0.49)  (3.58)***  (5.81)***  (5.70)***  (5.81)***  (4.41)*** 
Wage arrears  0.064  0.002   0.003  0.006   0.023  0.002   0.029   0.026  0.003  0.086 
  (0.96)  (0.03)  (0.08)  (0.13)  (0.43)  (0.03)  (0.60)  (0.62)  (0.07)  (1.68)* 
In kind income  0.029  0.031  0.081  0.093  0.203   0.003   0.055   0.083   0.118   0.306 
  (0.32)  (0.38)  (1.64)  (1.61)  (2.89)***  (0.03)  (0.55)  (0.95)  (1.39)  (3.12)*** 
Forced leave   0.435   0.276   0.206   0.149   0.203  0.145  0.031   0.010   0.176   0.067 
  (3.52)***  (2.39)**  (2.92)***  (1.84)*  (2.04)**  (0.84)  (0.26)  (0.10)  (1.67)*  (0.54) 
Unemployment   0.096   0.101   0.184   0.163   0.123   0.156   0.147   0.170   0.185   0.220 
  (1.06)  (1.26)  (3.74)***  (2.77)***  (1.76)*  (3.12)***  (4.31)***  (5.65)***  (6.28)***  (6.28)*** 
Town (OV: Village)   0.060   0.055   0.029   0.079   0.092   0.135   0.044   0.001  0.012  0.032 
  (0.81)  (0.81)  (0.72)  (1.63)  (1.50)  (2.86)***  (1.40)  (0.04)  (0.44)  (0.97) 
City   0.003   0.059   0.065   0.112   0.131   0.027   0.024  0.019  0.051  0.052 
  (0.03)  (0.85)  (1.58)  (2.39)**  (2.29)**  (0.51)  (0.69)  (0.60)  (1.71)*  (1.49) 
Kiev (OV: Center)  0.173  0.181  0.217  0.243  0.195  0.299  0.376  0.361  0.318  0.222 
  (1.05)  (1.19)  (2.33)**  (2.22)**  (1.41)  (3.23)***  (5.75)***  (6.23)***  (5.62)***  (3.38)*** 
West  0.170  0.126  0.167  0.174  0.147   0.086   0.058   0.023   0.021   0.018 
  (2.19)**  (1.80)*  (3.95)***  (3.52)***  (2.44)**  (1.69)*  (1.69)*  (0.75)  (0.70)  (0.51) 
East   0.061   0.051   0.047   0.036   0.022   0.044   0.020   0.009   0.010  0.044 
  (0.64)  (0.57)  (0.88)  (0.54)  (0.25)  (0.74)  (0.50)  (0.25)  (0.28)  (1.09) 
South  0.166  0.138  0.113  0.055  0.038  0.025  0.026  0.015  0.022  0.027 
  (1.88)*  (1.74)*  (2.42)**  (0.98)  (0.55)  (0.44)  (0.69)  (0.45)  (0.68)  (0.70) 
Constant  4.121  4.970  5.385  5.772  6.253  5.027  5.262  5.695  6.073  6.310 
  (19.28)***  (25.70)***  (43.63)***  (39.61)***  (34.05)***  (35.52)***  (53.29)***  (66.79)***  (71.33)***  (62.76)*** 
Observations  1485  1485  1485  1485  1485  3381  3381  3381  3381  3381 
Wald test, arrears=inkind 
=leave=unemploy=0 
4.53  2.21  7.31  3.78  4.36  2.68  4.84  8.27  10.81  13.07 
Prob > F  0.001  0.066  0.000  0.005  0.002  0.030  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; Source: Ukraine 96 and ULMS 2004, authors’ calculations. Determinants of Poverty during Transition  40 
 
Table 13: Ethnic discrimination in Ukraine 
 












    R  D=1  D=FH  Neumark 
pooled    R  D=1  D=FH  Neumark 
pooled 
base: non Ukrainian  0.080  99.0  0.289  28.6* 
base: Ukrainian  0.080   312.7 
 106.4   19.1 
0.289  32.8** 
30.6***  17.9*** 
FH is the frequency of the high group; C is the differential due to coefficients; CE is the differential due to interaction 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: Ukraine 96 and ULMS 2004, authors’ calculations. 
 